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One of the most important issues in the study of cognition is to understand which
are the factors determining internal representation of the external world. Previous
literature has started to highlight the impact of low-level sensory features (indexed
by saliency-maps) in driving attention selection, hence increasing the probability for
objects presented in complex and natural scenes to be successfully encoded into
working memory (WM) and then correctly remembered. Here we asked whether the
probability of retrieving high-saliency objects modulates the overall contents of WM,
by decreasing the probability of retrieving other, lower-saliency objects. We presented
pictures of natural scenes for 4 s. After a retention period of 8 s, we asked participants
to verbally report as many objects/details as possible of the previous scenes. We
then computed how many times the objects located at either the peak of maximal
or minimal saliency in the scene (as indexed by a saliency-map; Itti et al., 1998) were
recollected by participants. Results showed that maximal-saliency objects were recollected
more often and earlier in the stream of successfully reported items than minimal-
saliency objects. This indicates that bottom-up sensory salience increases the recollection
probability and facilitates the access to memory representation at retrieval, respectively.
Moreover, recollection of the maximal- (but not the minimal-) saliency objects predicted
the overall amount of successfully recollected objects: The higher the probability of having
successfully reported the most-salient object in the scene, the lower the amount of
recollected objects. These findings highlight that bottom-up sensory saliency modulates
the current contents of WM during recollection of objects from natural scenes, most
likely by reducing available resources to encode and then retrieve other (lower saliency)
objects.
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INTRODUCTION
When we look at a complex scene for a small amount of time we
will probably remember only some of the information that was
included in the original scene. The possibility of remembering
this information is strictly related to the chances of building an
internal (memory) representation of the scene. Although internal
representations are crucial for a number of high-level cognitive
processes (e.g., Fuster, 2006), it is still not entirely clear why
some objects in a scene have more chance than others to be
stored in memory (see, for reviews, Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012;
Kiyonaga and Egner, 2013). Previous literature provided evidence
that highlight the key role played by low-level sensory features
(i.e., line orientation, intensity contrast and color opponency, as
indexed by saliency-maps; Itti et al., 1998) in biasing attention
selection and working memory (WM) encoding (Stirk and
Underwood, 2007; Fine and Minnery, 2009; Melcher and Piazza,
2011; Santangelo and Macaluso, 2013; Spotorno et al., 2013; see,
for a recent review, Santangelo, 2015).
For instance, Fine and Minnery (2009) conducted a behavioral
study in which they asked participants to remember the position
of 3–5 target icons placed on a geographical map (encoding
phase). After a retention interval, participants were asked to
relocate the icons either on the map (50% of trials) or on
a blank screen (50% of trials). Irrespective of the retrieval
condition (map-on vs. map-off), Fine and Minnery found that
the more salient an icon was (quantified using Itti et al., 1998,
model), the more accurate subjects were in repositioning the
icons. These findings provided initial evidence about the impact
of low-level sensory features on the encoding of objects in
WM. Consistent findings were also reported by Santangelo and
Macaluso (2013) using a delayed match-to-sample task during
viewing of natural scenes. During fMRI scanning, participants
were presented with natural scenes for 4 s (encoding phase),
which were followed by a retention interval of 8 s. After that,
participants judged the location (same/different) of a target-
object extracted from the initial scene. Santangelo and Macaluso
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found that retrieval accuracy increased along with object saliency
at encoding, indicating that the probability of WM encoding was
a function of sensory salience.
Overall, this literature consistently demonstrated that bottom-
up sensory salience increases the probability of an object to be
successfully selected, and then stored in memory. Interestingly,
recent evidence suggests that the role of perceptual saliency
might not only affect the storage of single objects (according
to their specific saliency level), but the overall content of
the WM representation. Melcher and Piazza (2011) reported
a series of experiments in which they manipulated bottom-
up sensory salience of simple stimuli. For the memory set,
they presented displays including a variable number (i.e., a
variable set size) of Gabor patches with different orientations
for 200 ms. The saliency of one Gabor was manipulated by
increasing its contrast and/or size. After a delay of 1000 ms
a test Gabor was presented. Participants were asked to judge
whether the orientation of the test Gabor was the same or different
compared to the Gabor at the same location in the memory
set. Melcher and Piazza found that memory performance for
the most salient Gabor remained high, irrespective of increased
set size, while memory performance dropped dramatically with
set size when a non-salient item was tested. This finding was
interpreted by Melcher and Piazza as evidence that the overall
WM capacity was influenced by changes in the relative saliency
of the items.
A similar conclusion was reached by Pooresmaeili et al. (2014).
In each trial, they presented a tilted bar as a memory sample.
Participants had to keep in mind the orientation of this bar
for a following memory-based choice. In the next display, a bar
with the same orientation as the sample bar and a bar with a
different orientation were presented on either side of a central
fixation point. On some trials, Pooresmaeili et al. manipulated
the saliency of either the bar matching or not-matching with the
sample bar (changing its color to red), while in the remaining
trials all the bars were displayed in white (no salience condition).
In Exp. 1, participants were asked to find the test bar that matched
the orientation of the sample; while in Exp. 2, they had to find
the non-matching bar. Pooresmaeili et al. reported that their
participants chose a visually salient item more often when they
looked for matching features and less often when they looked for
a non-match, indicating that salient items are more likely to be
identified as a match. Pooresmaeili et al. interpreted this finding
in terms of capacity limitations during the test phase, in which
the visually salient item is more likely to consume WM resources,
with the effect to be erroneously identified as matching with the
memory sample.
These studies provided intriguing evidence linking perceptual
saliency to the modulation of available WM capacity. Here we
further investigate this issue using more complex stimuli, i.e.,
pictures representing natural scenes. Natural scenes typically
included multiple objects, which entail a high-level of stimulus
competition during attention selection and access in memory
(see, e.g., Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999; Henderson, 2003;
Hollingworth, 2012). We therefore aim to assess whether WM
capacity can be modulated by perceptual saliency (cf. Melcher
and Piazza, 2011; Pooresmaeili et al., 2014) also when using
complex and ecologically-valid material, i.e., complex and natural
scenes. For this, we presented pictures of natural scenes for
4 s. After a retention period of 8 s, we asked participants to
verbally report as many objects/details as possible of the previous
scenes (i.e., a free recollection task; e.g., Standing, 1973). We
then computed how many times the objects located at either
the peak of maximal- or minimal-saliency in the scene (as
indexed by a saliency-map; Itti et al., 1998) were recollected by
participants. This procedure allowed us to compute two different
indexes related to maximal- and minimal-saliency objects, namely
“recollection probability” and “recollection position” (i.e., the
probability of recollecting that object and its position in the
stream of reported items, respectively). If the selection and
storage of maximal-saliency objects is facilitated, we would
expect higher recollection probability for maximal- compared to
minimal-saliency objects. Similarly, if perceptual salience affects
the access to scene representation, we would expect that maximal-
saliency objects were recollected earlier than minimal-saliency
objects.
These indexes (recollection probability and recollection
position) were also used to assess the impact of bottom-up
sensory saliency in affecting the contents of WM by means
of two regression models, one for each saliency condition
(maximal or minimal). The choice to use free recollection was
motivated by the possibility of measuring WM capacity in a
natural context, in terms of the “amount of recollected objects”
within each scene. Accordingly, in the first regression model
we assessed whether the probability of recollecting maximal-
saliency objects (i.e., the recollection probability index) affected
the contents of WM, i.e., the overall amount of information
successfully reported by participants for each scene. We would
expect that the higher the probability of encoding and then
recollecting the maximal-saliency object, the more the decrease
in the overall amount of reported information. This would
indicate that bottom-up sensory saliency affects WM contents,
with the storage of the most-salient object in the scene
reducing the available resources to store and then recollect
other—lower saliency—objects (cf. Melcher and Piazza, 2011).
Within the same regression model we also assessed whether the
position in which the maximal-saliency object was recollected
(i.e., the recollection position index) affected the amount of
successfully reported information. This would suggest that the
impact of saliency on WM specifically arises during the access
to the scene representation stored in WM: the earlier the
maximal-saliency object is reported, the smaller the amount of
recollected information, indicating that the access to the memory
representation for the most-salient object in the scene decreases
resource availability to report other—lower saliency—objects. By
contrast, a null effect in this latter analysis (i.e., no impact of
the recollection position index on the amount of recollected
information) would be consistent with the notion that bottom-
up saliency mainly affect the encoding—more than retrieval—
of objects from natural scenes, in line with previous findings
(Santangelo and Macaluso, 2013). Finally, the second regression
model assessed the influence of recollection probability and
recollection position on the amount of successfully reported
information, but now specifically for minimal-saliency objects.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Diagram showing the sequence of events during one trial.
The trial began with a picture presented for 4 s (encoding phase). A blank
display was then shown for 8 s (delay phase), and was followed by a “start
recollecting” signal. Participants had no time constraint to recollect as much
objects/details as possible from the previous scene. When the recollection
was over, participants pressed the space bar for the next trial. (B) Selection of
target-objects corresponding to the point of maximal- (red line) or
minimal-saliency (yellow line) in the scene.
We would expect no significant effects for this analysis, indicating
that objects associated with low-levels of bottom-up saliency are




Twenty healthy volunteers (9 males; mean age = 24.2 years,
ranging from 21 to 34 years), students at the University of Perugia,
participated in the study. They all gave written informed consent
and were naïve to the main purpose of the study.
STIMULI AND TASK
The set of stimuli consisted of one hundred pictures depicting
scenes of everyday life. These images were collected on the
World Wide Web and had already been used by Santangelo and
Macaluso (2013). The pictures included internal (e.g., a kitchen,
a bathroom, etc.) and external scenes (e.g., a garden, a street,
etc.), but no single-object photo or living things such as people
or animals.
The task consisted in an encoding phase (4 s), a maintenance
phase (8 s delay), and a recollection phase (time unlimited)
(see Figure 1A). During the encoding phase, participants were
presented with a picture, displayed at 18 × 12◦ of visual angle.
Participants were required to memorize as many details as
possible for later recollection. In fact, following the 8 s delay
(blank screen), a display with the signal “start recollecting” was
presented, and participants were asked to report verbally as many
objects/details as possible of the previous scene. Participants were
instructed to be as accurate as possible, taking all the time they
needed (i.e., no time constraint in the recollection phase). When
their recollection was over, participants pressed the space bar to
move to the next trial. After an inter-trial interval of 1 s a new
scene was presented. The order of trials was randomized across
participants. Participants’ verbal responses were recorded with an
external microphone and digitalized into .wav files.
DATA ANALYSIS
Each picture has been analyzed with the Saliency Toolbox 2.2,1
which computes saliency maps using local discontinuities in line
orientation, intensity contrast, and color opponency (Itti et al.,
1998). Using the saliency map, we designated for each picture two
“target” objects, corresponding either to the point of maximal-
salience of the scene (i.e., the maximal-saliency object) or to
the point of minimal-salience of the scene (i.e., the minimal-
saliency object; see also Figure 1B). To avoid any ambiguity
in selecting the maximal- or minimal-saliency objects within
each scene, we excluded those objects (typically, large objects)
located over more than one peak of saliency. In fact, it would be
unclear in this case which value of saliency should be assigned
to that object. This procedure therefore allowed us to be more
confident about the contribution of saliency on object memory,
computing retrieval performance (see below) associated with
clear levels of saliency. Twenty-nine pictures of the initial set
were excluded from further analyses, because it was impossible
to select within these scenes objects located over one single
peak of either maximal or minimal saliency. Importantly, in the
final set of pictures there was a significant difference between
the average saliency score for maximal- (2.36) and minimal-
saliency (0.27) objects (t(70), p < 0.001). As a final constraint,
we made sure that the size of target-objects did not significantly
differ between maximal- and minimal-salience conditions (t(70);
p = 0.526).
Participants’ verbal responses were tabulated into a datasheet.
Objects in a scene were coded as successfully recollected only
when correctly named. When the scene included a number of
similar objects (e.g., several “cups” of different colors), an object
was assigned as successfully recollected only when it was possible
to establish univocally object/name relation (e.g., the recollection
of a “green” or a “red” cup). Among the objects recollected by each
participant within each scene we searched for the target-object,
1http://www.saliencytoolbox.net/
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Bar graph showing a higher probability to recollect objects
corresponding at the location of maximal (red bar) as compared to minimal
(yellow bar) saliency in the scene. (B) Average position in the streams of
recollected objects, indicating that objects corresponding at locations of
maximal saliency were reported earlier than objects at minimal saliency. In
both graphs, the error bars represents the standard error of the mean.
designated according to maximal- vs. minimal-level of perceptual
saliency (see above).
For each scene and for each participant we computed whether
the target-objects (at maximal- or minimal-saliency locations)
were successfully recollected, and, if this was the case, what were
their positions in the stream of recollected items. This procedure
allowed us to compute the mean recollection probability (see
Figure 2A) and the mean recollection position (see Figure 2B)
of maximal- and minimal-saliency objects. The target-object
position in the stream of recollected objects was scaled by
the total amount of objects recollected for that scene by that
participant (i.e., recollection position index = target-object
position / total amount of recollected objects). This weighting
procedure allowed us to compare more accurately the meaning
of the different target positions among them: for instance, a
target-object position of four when twelve objects were recollected
has an entirely different meaning compared to when only four
objects were recollected, i.e., among the first positions or the
last position, respectively. This index varied between 0 and 1:
the closer it was to 0, the more the target-object was recollected
among the first positions; by contrast, the closer it was to
1, the more the target-object was recollected among the last
positions.
Finally, we computed the amount of recollected objects
for each scene by each participant when either the maximal-
or minimal-saliency object was successfully recollected (i.e.,
when the target-object was part of the internal memory
representation of the scene). This amount was now scaled by
the average amount recollected by all participants in that scene
(i.e., recollected amount = number of objects recollected by
that participant/average amount of objects recollected by all
participants). Again, this weighting procedure allowed us to
compare more accurately the meaning of each amount among
them: for instance, to recollect six objects in a scene in which
the whole group recollected an average of twelve objects is
a poor performance, but recollecting six objects when the
group recollected an average of five is an excellent performance.
The closer this index was to 1, the closer the single subject
performance was to the group average; the more this index
was distant from 1, the more the performance was distant
to the group average (i.e., poorer performance <1; better
performance >1). Averaging across participants, we obtained
the mean scaled amount of recollected objects for each single
scene.
To assess the impact of perceptual saliency on WM
contents we used two regression analyses, one for each saliency
condition (maximal or minimal). Before the analysis we
made sure that our data did not violate the assumption of
homoscedasticity. In line with our predictions, we expected
an effect only for the regression model related to the
maximal-saliency condition, indicating that a high-level of
bottom-up sensory salience predicts the overall amount of
successfully recollected information. More specifically, the
first regression analysis assessed whether the probability of
having or not having recollected the maximal-saliency object
(recollection probability index) and the access at retrieval to
the stored representation (recollection position index) predicted
the contents of WM, i.e., the scaled amount of recollected
objects for that given scene. In this regression model we used
the recollection probability and the recollection position as
predictors, and the scaled amount of recollected objects as
dependent variable. Importantly, this approach (i.e., using two
predictors instead of carrying out separate regression models)
has the advantage of estimating the particular influence of
each predictor while controlling for the influence of the other
predictors at the same time. The second regression model was
analogous to the first model, but now including the indexes
related to minimal-saliency objects (again, the recollection
probability and position as predictors, and the scaled amount
of recollected objects as dependent variable). The data were
analyzed with SPSS 13.0 (Statistical Package for Social Science,
SPSS Inc.).
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FIGURE 3 | Scaled amount (N) of recollected objects when the
maximal (panels A and B) or the minimal-saliency target (panels C
and D) was successfully reported as a function of either the
recollection probability (panels A and C) or the recollection position
(B and D) of the target. Overall, these graphs indicate that the
probability to have successfully recollected the maximal-saliency
(MaxSal) object reduced the overall amount of recollected objects
(cf. panel A).
RESULTS
Overall, participants reported a mean of 5.0 objects across
the scenes, with marked differences related to the recollection
probability of maximal- and minimal-saliency objects, as
highlighted in Figure 2A. A two-tailed paired-samples t-test
revealed a significant difference for our participants in the
probability of recollecting objects according to their saliency
level (t(19) = 15.4; p < 0.001), with maximal-saliency objects
(0.66± 0.02) reported far more frequently than minimal-saliency
objects (0.43 ± 0.02). Next, we analyzed whether perceptual
saliency affected the position in which maximal- vs. minimal-
saliency objects were recollected. As highlighted in Figure 2B,
maximal-saliency objects (0.55 ± 0.01) were recollected earlier
than minimal-saliency objects (0.65 ± 0.01; t(19) = −6.8;
p< 0.001), indicating that maximal-salient objects are prioritized
during the recollection phase.
The impact of perceptual saliency on free recollection of
objects from natural scenes was further investigated by two
regression analyses. These were used to establish whether
increasing bottom-up sensory saliency at encoding (indexed
by the probability to have successfully recollected maximal-
saliency objects) and the specific access at retrieval to the stored
representation of the scene (indexed by the recollection position)
predicted the overall amount of successfully recollected objects
(i.e., WM contents; see Melcher and Piazza, 2011). We found
that, the current amount of successfully recollected information
was modulated by perceptual saliency. The first regression model
was significant (F(2,70) = 15.9, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.319), and
revealed a significant effect of the recollection probability index
(β = −0.512, t = −4.7, p < 0.001; see Figure 3A) on the amount
of recollected objects, but no effect of the recollection position
index (β = 0.113, t = 1.0, p = 0.302; see Figure 3B).2 Then,
the higher the probability of recollecting the maximal-salient
2Following the inspection of Figure 3A, one might argue that this regression
analysis could be affected by an outlier data point (cf. the red dot in the
upper-left corner). However, the regression model was still significant after
removing this data point (F(2,69) = 12.4, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.269), showing
again a significant effect of the recollection probability index (β = −0.506,
t =−4.5, p< 0.001) on the amount of recollected objects, but no effect of the
recollection position index (β = 0.036, t = 0.3, p = 0.748).
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object, the more the decrease in the amount of successfully
recollected information. By contrast, the recollection position
of the maximal-salience objects did not significantly predict
the amount of successfully recollected information, indicating
that the specific access to scene representation at retrieval did
not affect the current contents of WM. The second regression
model was instead not significant (F(2,70) < 1, n.s., R2 = 0.015),
indicating that neither the recollection probability (β = −0.126,
t = −1.0, p = 0.329; see Figure 3C) nor the recollection position
(β = −0.017, t = −0.1, p = 0.893; see Figure 3D) of minimal-
saliency objects significantly predicted the amount of successfully
recollected information.
DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to investigate whether low-level sensory
features (i.e., bottom-up saliency) affected the probability of
objects to be recollected from natural scenes, and, if so,
whether the probability of recollecting maximal-saliency objects
modulated the overall contents of WM. We presented pictures
of natural scenes involving high-levels of competition among
to-be-remembered objects. After an encoding phase of 4 s, and
a retention phase of 8 s, we asked participants to verbally
report as many objects as they could remember of the previous
scene (i.e., a free-recollection task). It is worth noting here that
free-recollection may suffer from potential limitations due to
the involvement of other high-level cognitive functions, such
as language (i.e., the requirement to “verbally” report the
remembered objects). For instance, during the recollection phase
a participant might fail to recall the “verbal label” (i.e., the
name) corresponding to a specific object, with a consequent
failure in verbally reporting that object, even though this was
successfully stored into the internal memory representation.
Crucially, however, here we did not make any specific assumption
related to objects that were not recollected; by contrast, our
analyses involved only those objects that were successfully
recollected. Although we cannot assess whether objects that are
not recollected are stored in memory or not, we must assume
that a memory representation of the recollected objects exists.
We therefore believe that the information related to successfully
recollected objects in the current paradigm is reliable and
can inform us about internal memory representation (or WM
content) of those objects in the scene.
The current findings revealed that the probability of
recollecting objects varied dramatically according to their
saliency level at encoding (i.e., during scene viewing), with
maximal-saliency objects reported far more often than minimal-
saliency objects. We also found that the access to scene
representation was facilitated for maximal-saliency objects,
which were reported earlier in the stream of recollected items
compared to minimal-saliency objects. Finally, we found that
the probability to recollect maximal- (but not minimal-)
saliency objects significantly predicted the overall amount of
successfully recollected objects: the higher the probability of
recollecting the maximal-saliency object, the lower the amount of
recollected objects. Importantly, this effect was not significantly
modulated by the current position of the target-object in
the stream of reported items, indicating that this effect did
not arise during access to the stored representation of the
scene.
The increased memory performance (i.e., the recollection
probability index) for maximal- vs. minimal-saliency objects is
in line with the previous literature (Fine and Minnery, 2009;
Santangelo and Macaluso, 2013). This effect is in agreement with
the notion that bottom-up attention can modulate short-term
memory, by increasing the likelihood of attentional “grabbing”
items to be remembered later on (see, e.g., Schmidt et al., 2002;
Botta et al., 2010). However, it is worth noting that here we
use a more demanding WM task as compared to the previous
literature (i.e., a free recollection task). Fine and Minnery (2009)
used a task requiring a low-level of competition among the
possible objects/targets, consisting on the encoding of only 3–5
items in each trial (i.e., not overloading WM capacity; Luck and
Vogel, 2013). Santangelo and Macaluso (2013) used instead a task
requiring a higher-lever of competition at encoding, presenting
pictures of natural scenes (actually, the same as those used here),
including a number of possible memory targets in each scene (i.e.,
a supra-span condition). However, Santangelo and Macaluso used
at retrieval a visuo-spatial recognition test, presenting as memory
target an object cut-out from the previous scene in the same or
in a different position. This may have elicited responses simply
based on a sense of “familiarity” with the scene. Here we use a
more demanding WM task compared to this previous literature,
that is a free recollection task (Craik and McDowd, 1987). As
in all free recollection tasks (e.g., Lieberman and Culpepper,
1965), participants had no hints about the original scene (or—
more generally—about the studied material), and they can only
report what they had successfully encoded during scene viewing.
The current finding therefore highlights that the saliency effect
on memory performance is robust, revealing a prioritization on
internal memory representation of maximal-saliency objects, over
and above any sense of familiarity with the scene.
Bottom-up saliency not only increases the probability for an
object to be recollected, but also speeds-up the access to the
stored (memory) representation during the recollection phase.
In fact, we found that maximal-saliency objects were recollected
earlier than minimal-saliency objects in the stream of reported
items. This prioritization effect at the retrieval phase is in line
with recent findings reported by Pooresmaeili et al. (2014):
they used a different paradigm wherein the salient/non-salient
comparison was made at memory retrieval. Here we did not
emphasize in any way one object above the others at encoding or
retrieval (i.e., we used a “free” recollection task). Notwithstanding
that, participants recollected the maximal-saliency object earlier
than the minimal-saliency object. This might be interpreted in
terms of a facilitated access (or a “prior entry”; see Spence and
Parise, 2010) in the stored representation of the scene for objects
located—during the encoding phase—at peaks of maximal-
saliency.
Finally, the current findings highlight the role of perceptual
saliency in affecting the overall number of objects successfully
recollected from natural scenes. This finding might be interpreted
in the light of the previous literature (Melcher and Piazza, 2011;
see also Pooresmaeili et al., 2014), showing that bottom-up
saliency affects the availability of WM resources, thus influencing
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its capacity. Accordingly, here we found that the higher the
probability of reporting the most-salient object in the scene, the
lower the overall amount of information successfully recollected
in that scene. Although maximal-saliency objects are recollected
on average earlier than minimal-saliency objects (see Discussion
above and Figure 2B), the specific position of the maximal-
saliency object in the stream of reported items did not affect the
overall amount of recollected information (cf. the first regression
model; see also red line in Figure 3B). In other words, the
reduction in WM capacity was not modulated by the position of
the target-object in the stream of recollected objects at retrieval.
Although the interpretation of null effects has to be always very
cautious, this finding (deserving further assessment in future
research) seems to indicate that the decrease in the overall amount
of successfully reported information did not arise during the
attempt to access the information related to the target-object in
the internal representation of the scene (see Pooresmaeili et al.,
2014). By contrast, we suggest that during scene viewing (i.e.,
the encoding phase) the more an object is efficient to grab
participants’ attention resources (according to its saliency level;
see, e.g., Nardo et al., 2011, 2014), the less spared resources
would be available to process other, lower-saliency, objects in the
scene.
We acknowledge that the current task was not specifically
designed to address the issue of whether the impact of perceptual
saliency on WM contents arise at encoding or retrieval. In
fact, we only collected WM performance at retrieval, without
measuring any behavioral and/or physiological parameter during
the encoding phase. Notwithstanding that, we note that our
interpretation might be in good agreement with several models
postulating an assignment of “attentional priorities” under
conditions of high-levels of conflict/competitions among the
stimuli (see, e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Itti and Koch,
2001; Pessoa, 2009). The assignment of attentional priorities
might directly affect short-term memory representation (e.g.,
Bundesen, 1990). According to Bundesen et al. (2005, 2011),
attention selection mechanisms would directly change the
number of cortical neurons used to represent a given object,
with the number of neurons increasing as a function of the
task-relevance of the object itself. As a consequence, behaviorally
important objects would have a high probability of winning
the competition to be encoded and thus accessing an internal
representation through the short-term memory system. The latter
is conceived as a feedback mechanism that sustains activity in
the neurons that have won the attentional selection/competition
(see also Cowan, 1995, 2011, for a similar notion). Here we
used a task in which all objects in the scene were equally task-
relevant. In fact, we asked participants to freely report all objects
they could remember. Notwithstanding that, we showed that
objects corresponding to the point of maximal (vs. minimal)
saliency in the scene were recollected with higher probability
(reducing at the same time the overall amount of information
successfully reported). This is consistent with the notion that
visual saliency plays a key role in assigning attentional priorities
(see, for reviews, Thompson and Bichot, 2005; Gottlieb, 2007).
Speculatively, we interpret our findings within the framework of
Bundesen et al.’s theory: the most-salient object would receive
attentional resources and then encoding priority; this would
lead to a higher recollection probability for the most-salient
objects, but also to less attention resources for the other (lower
saliency) objects in the scene, consistent with the reduction in
the overall amount of information successfully recollected (cf.
Figure 3A).
To conclude, the current study provided initial evidence that
the processing of a maximal-saliency object in a natural scene
is prioritized during formation of objects/scene memory traces
and during later access to this stored representation. We found
a reduction of the overall amount of successfully recollected
information when maximal-salience objects entered the internal
memory representation, thus having a higher chance to be
recollected later on. We interpreted such a reduction as evidence
that high-level perceptual saliency tends to exhaust attentional
resources during the exploration of a natural and complex
scene.
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